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Prevention No Cure: A Critique of 
the Report of Australia’s National 
Preventative Health Taskforce
Mark Harrison and Alex Robson1
Abstract
Australia’s National Preventative Health Taskforce baulks at the economic 
approach to public policy that weighs up costs and benefits, and instead adopts 
a ‘healthist’ perspective, with an open-ended and unconditional commitment to 
maximising health and a jumbling of private and external costs. The result is 
to overstate the benefits, and ignore the costs, of proposed policies. While this is 
predictable given the interests and agenda of preventative health advocates, it is not 
desirable. Not only is the economic approach mandated for regulatory reform, it has 
a number of advantages in determining the likely effects of policies and identifying 
unintended consequences. Although the Taskforce emphasises the irrationality of 
consumers, it is not clear whether a preventative health bureaucracy will improve 
the efficiency of health spending.
Introduction
In their 2009 report Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020, the National 
Preventative Health Taskforce (‘The Taskforce’) made a number of policy 
recommendations regarding obesity, alcohol consumption and tobacco control. 
It recommended that a minimum price of alcohol be regulated; that there be 
widespread use of the tax system to discourage sedentary behaviour; that the 
price of tobacco should rise; and that tobacco manufacturing and packaging 
be further regulated. Given the sheer number of recommendations proposed 
by the Taskforce and their wide-ranging scope, it is important to investigate 
whether the Report constitutes a thorough and complete analysis, whether it 
is based on a rigorous assessment of the evidence on the issues it canvasses. 
This paper assesses how well the Taskforce Report meets these requirements.
1 Mark Harrison, University of Wollongong; markharrison@ozemail.com.au. Alex Robson, Griffith 
University.
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The Taskforce Report’s methodology
The economic approach versus the ‘healthist’ 
approach to primary prevention
The approach taken in the Taskforce report and that of the authors of the papers 
they commissioned and studies they cite have a number of common features. 
They all adopt a public health approach, which economist Eric Crampton (among 
others) has labelled a ‘healthist’ norm.2
While economists try to account for all costs and benefits, the healthist norm 
measures only the health benefits of a policy. For example, the Taskforce 
proclaims its commitment to Australia ‘becoming the healthiest country’. 
Nobody would disagree with the proposition that, all else being equal, better 
health outcomes are preferable to worse health outcomes. However, resources are 
scarce and individuals (and society as a whole) have other goals. The economic 
approach recognises that there are trade-offs between health and these other 
goals. Resources spent on health have an opportunity cost. Devoting more 
resources to prevention means that those resources cannot be devoted to other 
economic activities. To the Taskforce, opportunity cost is reduced to the missed 
benefits of possible activities that have not received government funding! 
‘The fourth rationale for selecting components of the Strategy is that of 
minimising opportunity cost — that is, the opportunities and benefits missed 
because of activities that have not been funded.’3
An open-ended commitment to promoting health eschews the very concept 
of trade-offs, and provides no limit to the budget and powers of the agency 
responsible for health policy.
Despite proposing a major expansion of regulation and major tax changes — 
indeed, a fundamental shift in government influence over individual decisions 
and market processes and outcomes — the costs and benefits of its proposed 
policies are not, as a rule, assessed in the Report.
In the health economics and insurance literature (and in the Taskforce Report), 
preventative activity which alters the probability distribution of losses is 
known as ‘primary prevention’. It is the use of costly effort to reduce (but, in 
most cases, not completely eliminate) the probability of a loss occurring. Loss 
prevention is also known as ‘self-protection’ in the economics literature, and has 
been analysed at length by economists.4 One of the key issues in this literature 
2 See Crampton (2009a).
3 Taskforce Report: 34.
4 The seminal paper in this literature is Becker and Ehrlich (1972).
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is whether, and under what circumstances, an individual or group that faces a 
risk (or a set of risks) can and should take costly action(s) to alter the nature of 
those risks (by affecting the probability distribution of the risks that are faced), 
and thereby seek to improve their wellbeing (usually measured in terms of ex-
ante expected utility). Another key issue is how optimal preventative effort is 
affected by other activities that can influence an individual’s (or group’s) ex-
ante expected utility, such as market insurance and self-insurance.
A key conclusion of this literature is that preventative effort should be 
undertaken until the marginal benefit (the reduction in expected losses) of 
the last unit of effort is equal to its marginal cost, where ‘cost’ refers to the 
opportunity cost — the value of resources in their best alternative use.
In theory, individuals may choose an inefficiently low level of primary prevention 
for a variety of reasons. For example, in an insurance setting where the actions 
of the insured cannot be perfectly observed by the insurer, the insured may 
have an incentive not to expend costly effort on reducing the probability of high 
future health costs, because they know these costs will be covered under their 
existing insurance arrangements. If the insurer cannot monitor preventative 
effort, increased preventative effort will not be reflected in lower premiums, 
and so the insured will have little incentive to invest in prevention. To take 
another example, if an individual in an imperfect information setting has 
chosen to consume a product that has certain health risks and underestimates 
the probability of those risks, then at any given price the consumer will tend 
to consume an inefficiently high amount of the good. Finally, another example 
of inefficiently low prevention arises when prevention taken by one individual 
confers unpriced spill-over benefits on others (for example, immunisation), 
or when consumption of a good imposes unpriced external costs on other 
consumers.
But prevention might also be inefficiently high, especially where decision makers 
do not take into account the costs of the preventative effort. An obvious instance 
is when the person undertaking the prevention reaps the benefits but does not 
pay the costs. In some instances, this is simply because the costs are not fully 
priced: for example, when my purchase of a stronger bumper bar protects my 
vehicle, but at the expense of greater harm to the vehicles of others. Equally, if 
there are government subsidies that favour prevention over other health-related 
goods and services (or if prevention is taxed relatively favourably compared 
to other health-related goods and services), then too much prevention may be 
provided and consumed. For example, if consumers have imperfect information 
and overestimate the probability of health risks of a certain product, then an 
inefficiently low amount of that good might be consumed.
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As the Taskforce focuses on the effects of policies on the health system, it 
ignores many of the costs of its policies. In particular, it does not recognise the 
very different policy relevance of private and external costs.
The Taskforce jumbles private and external costs
The total cost of anything may be divided into ‘private costs’ and ‘external 
costs’. Supposing a consumer makes a decision that results in costs, then the 
costs borne by the consumer are private costs. The costs imposed on others are 
external costs.
The key point is that the consumer does not take account of the costs imposed 
on others in his decision making. As a result, external costs may be incurred 
(without any compensating benefit): external costs are excessively high and 
there may be a role for government to reduce them.
In contrast, the consumer does take account of private costs, and will incur 
them only when they are worth incurring; that is, when the private costs of an 
individual’s choices are smaller than the private benefits of those choices. The 
Taskforce ignores these benefits, yet they mean private losses, to the extent that 
they are borne by rational, well-informed consumers, are not policy relevant 
and so there is no economic reason for policy to address those particular costs.
Consider, for example, the case of skiing — a risky activity that has both 
costs and benefits.5 For the purposes of our discussion there are two kinds of 
costly risks involved. If a skier has an accident and imposes costs on nobody 
other than himself and had an understanding of the likely level of those costs, 
then those costs, however significant, are purely private. The presumption of 
consumer rationality dictates that the skier’s expected private benefits from 
skiing outweighed the expected private accident costs. On the other hand, 
skiers may also be involved in accidents with other skiers, who may also suffer 
damage. In this case, there are external losses to consider, and these are policy 
relevant. But the source and economic nature of the two costs are very different; 
it makes no economic sense to lump both kinds of costs together and develop 
policies which attempt to reduce or completely eliminate both.
In the economic approach, only external costs are relevant for the assessment 
of primary prevention-policy interventions by government. If the consumer 
does not take account of some private costs because of irrationality or imperfect 
information about the health risks of a product, then they may be akin to 
external costs. But the appropriate government intervention depends on the 
5 This example is used by Crampton (2009b).
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particular irrationality or information bias. In general, a lack of information 
gives rise to a case for providing more information. If people underestimate 
private costs, only the underestimate should be the focus of policy.
The Taskforce, and the consultants it relies on, emphasise gross health costs, the 
aggregation of both external and private costs. For many non-economists the 
policy goal then becomes (either implicitly or explicitly) to significantly reduce 
or completely eliminate all of these losses, no matter what the cost. ‘Focusing on 
minimising gross health alone suggests extreme, prohibitive policies.’6
Ignoring the difference between external and internal benefits and costs also 
runs the risk of creating a misleading impression for members of the public who 
are concerned about the costs that might be imposed on them by smokers. When 
the Taskforce Report states that ‘the overall cost of smoking to the economy 
is more than $30 billion each year’ (Collins and Lapsley 2008), it gives non-
smokers the impression that smokers are imposing these costs on non-smokers 
whereas most of the economic literature finds that the bulk of the estimated 
costs are actually borne by the smokers themselves. Attributing internal costs 
that are actually borne by smokers themselves as part of the ‘cost of smoking to 
the economy’ incorrectly attributes those costs.
The fundamental problem with the non-economic approach is that it can lead to 
policies which needlessly make members of the community worse off.  The net 
economic benefits of proposed policy changes which aim to avoid all losses — 
even if those policies effectively achieve this goal — will be grossly overstated, 
because the forgone private benefits of the behaviour at issue are being 
ignored. This means that even when cost-benefit analyses of policy changes are 
conducted, such analyses will likely overstate the net benefits of policy, and will 
likely lead to socially wasteful policy choices.
The net benefits of policy changes will only ever be a fraction of the total health 
costs that are attributed to obesity, alcohol consumption and tobacco use. The 
fact that ‘prevention works’ and reduces observed costs does not automatically 
mean that implementing the policy will raise the community’s overall wellbeing.
It is important to appreciate that the economic assumption of rationality does 
not require ‘full information’. For example, it is not necessary that a smoker 
have a full understanding of all of the health ramifications of smoking. All that 
is required is an understanding of the likely level of future health costs.
If some consumers do not have an understanding of the likely level of future 
health costs, then there is, in principle, a case for corrective taxes. However, 
this case needs to be made out rigorously and to be carefully justified using 
6 Clarke (2008): 29.
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a detailed assessment of costs and benefits. To make out a convincing case for 
higher taxation, it is not enough to simply assert that consumers operate in 
a world of incomplete, imperfect information. Such an assertion is vacuously 
true, but it does not tell us what the correct level of taxation is, and how that 
compares with current tax rates.
Even if some consumers do not understand the likely level of future health 
costs, such taxes may worsen the community’s wellbeing for two reasons:
•	 First, it may not be the case that all consumers misunderstand the likely 
level of future health costs. Taxation affects the price that all consumers 
pay, whether they understand those costs or not. An increase in taxes may 
induce ‘uninformed’ consumers to make the ‘right’ decision by signalling to 
them the true future health costs. But higher taxation will induce ‘informed’ 
consumers to consume less than their individually optimal amount. This 
is no less true for goods like cigarettes, for which there is no safe level of 
consumption.
•	 Second, it may not necessarily be the case that consumers always 
underestimate the future health costs of their choices; they may just as 
easily overestimate the likely level of future health costs. In fact, behavioural 
economics emphasises the bias towards overestimating the probability of 
rare events.
There is good evidence that, as a general rule, smokers tend to overestimate 
the adverse health effects of smoking. Viscusi (1992) conducted a large scale 
US national survey of lung-cancer risk perceptions, in which participants were 
asked to indicate the number out of 100 smokers who would develop lung 
cancer. He reports (p. 7) that:
The main finding with respect to risk perceptions for lung cancer is 
that not only is there substantial awareness of smoking hazards, but 
overall individuals appear to overestimate the risks compared with the 
levels in the scientific evidence. Whereas the best scientific estimates 
of the lifetime lung cancer risks from smoking range from 0.05 to 
0.1, individual perceptions of the risk are much greater. The entire 
population assesses this risk at 0.43, and even current smokers have a 
substantial risk perception of 0.37. The fraction underestimating the 
risk is less than 10 per cent, and the extent of their risk underestimation 
is comparatively small in magnitude.
That is, imperfect information or a misunderstanding of future health costs 
may actually lead to less smoking than if risks were accurately perceived. An 
increase in taxes would increase rather than reduce the costs of misperceptions. 
Further, if people overestimate future health costs, then campaigns alerting 
them to these risks will have little effect.
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Further, the justification for the rationality assumption is not that people always 
know what is best for themselves, but that they are more certain to seek their own 
interests than are others. In particular, bureaucracies have their own interests 
and incentives, not necessarily promoting efficient levels of preventative 
expenditure. Political motives, empire building and other objectives will play 
a role.
The relevant question is whether individuals will better promote their own 
interests if they make decisions compared with government officials making 
decisions for them through the political process. Economic policies should be 
assessed in terms of the incentives they create and the consequences that follow, 
rather than simply the goals they proclaim.
Self-interested bureaucrats receive pecuniary and non-pecuniary gains from 
controlling larger programs and by increasing the size of their own bureaucracies 
(for example, increases in power, prestige, promotion prospects and salary). 
They may even believe it is in the public interest to expand the activities of 
their organisation. They push for larger-than-optimal levels of bureaucracy 
(empire building) and increase their own rewards. They have an incentive to 
increase program size, even if the incremental benefits to program recipients are 
less than the costs. They have an incentive to exaggerate the demand for, and 
understate the costs of, extra programs.
Overstatement of benefits
Smoking may depend on unobserved individual characteristics — such as the 
degree of risk aversion or the individual’s discount factor — that also influence 
health through other channels. Smokers or heavy drinkers are likely to differ 
from those that do not engage in this behaviour. For example, smokers tend to 
be greater risk takers, working in riskier jobs and/or require a lower payment to 
bear that risk. Smokers are less likely to perform preventative health activities 
such as wearing seatbelts, flossing their teeth, and checking their blood pressure. 
Smokers are more likely to be injured at work (controlling for objective measures 
of risk) and at home. They are also more likely to be heavy drinkers. The greater 
risk taking of smokers reflects a broader pattern of behaviour and is not limited 
to smoking decisions.7
As a result, public policies that decrease smoking prevalence may not achieve 
large gains in life expectancy or large economies in health expenditure. Smokers 
who quit or reduce their consumption of cigarettes would certainly face a lower 
7 See Hersch and Viscusi (1990) and (1998).
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risk of tobacco-related diseases, such as lung cancer, but would not necessarily 
see their life expectancy increase by large margins. Estimates of the effect of 
tobacco on health costs that do not account for this would tend to be biased.
The healthist norm also makes no allowance for offsetting increases in health costs 
resulting from their policies. For example, the average quitter puts on weight, 
aggravating potential obesity problems and any associated health costs. Policies 
that save lives are good things, but they do not necessarily reduce medical costs, 
as they can increase the demand for spending on other conditions. Non-smokers 
incur some health-care costs that smokers do not. Studies that compare health 
costs for smokers and non-smokers are consequently ambiguous — many find 
that lifetime health costs are greater for non-smokers.8
Extending life is a benefit, but there is no need to exaggerate the benefits by 
claiming that it must always result in lower health costs. Saving lives is not the 
same as reducing health costs. For example, the success of a major life-saving 
intervention, such as a by-pass operation, extends life but, precisely because the 
patients have greater chances of survival, the intervention may result in another 
major intervention in the future. Savings lives is, of course, desirable and both 
life-saving interventions can be worth the cost and result in net benefits — but 
health costs rise rather than fall.
When cost benefit analysis is done in the report, what are evaluated are the 
benefits of reaching a target, not the costs and benefits of the Taskforce report’s 
proposed polices. That is, it is presumed that the policies will cause the targets 
to be met, rather than assessing the likely effects of the policies. The target may 
be desirable, but the relevant policy issue is whether the policies proposed in 
the Taskforce report will achieve them, and at what cost.
The costs and benefits of a policy require a counterfactual scenario — what 
would happen without the policy? — to provide a base case from which the 
incremental costs and benefits of a policy can be determined. For example, the 
Taskforce does recognise that smoking rates have been declining, but nowhere 
does it systematically discuss the implications of what would happen to the rate 
if policies were to remain unchanged. Thus, it is impossible to work out the 
contribution of the Taskforce’s policies to meeting its reduced smoking targets.
The number of people who have died in the past and the current costs of 
smoking are the consequence of past smoking rates, not current smoking rates. 
Computing future costs on the basis of current costs — which are themselves 
based on past rates of smoking, not current or expected future smoking rates 
— makes no economic sense. Similarly, designing the path of future corrective 
taxes based on past and current behaviour has little economic justification.
8 See, for example, Barendregt et al. (1997).
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The Taskforce Report argues that taxes on tobacco will improve equity because 
those who quit will no longer experience smoking-related health problems. 
But this claim ignores the costs of quitting and the fact that tobacco demand 
is price inelastic. It only applies to marginal consumers — those who change 
behaviour as a result of the policy change. It ignores inframarginal consumers: 
since tobacco is price inelastic, a large number of low-income individuals will 
continue to smoke even after the proposed tax increase. In the absence of 
compensation, these individuals will be made unambiguously worse off as a 
result of the proposed tax increase. And since the studies that the Taskforce 
cites to support its case tend to overestimate the reduction in demand from 
the Report’s proposed policies, they also tend to underestimate the number of 
inframarginal consumers. This means that the equity effects of the Taskforce 
Report’s policies are likely to be much greater than the Report anticipates.
For all these reasons, the public health approach overstates the benefits from 
interventions.
Underestimation of costs
Neither does the Taskforce — nor its consultants — account for health costs of 
discouraging moderate drinking or encouraging substitution into drugs. As a 
pioneering study into the effects of tobacco, alcohol and drugs on mortality and 
morbidity in Australia observed:
In addition to the harmful effects, however, when consumed at moderate 
levels alcohol appears to be associated with a decrease in heart disease 
and stroke. The number of people in Australia who drink at moderate 
levels far outweighs the number who drink at hazardous or harmful 
levels, so this apparent protective effect is greater for the overall 
population than the harmful effect for deaths, though not for potential 
years of life lost.9
The Taskforce Report does not explain how policies such as having higher 
taxes would reduce problem drinking without reducing beneficial, moderate 
drinking. Indeed, the best evidence shows heavy drinkers and light drinkers 
respond less to price increases than do moderate drinkers.10 Higher taxes are 
likely to have the greatest effect on the moderate drinkers. As a result, even from 
a narrow, ‘healthist’, point of view, they are likely to do more harm than good.
9 See Ridolfo and Stevenson (2001): xiii
10 See, for example, Manning, Blumbergb and Moulton (1995).
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Advantages of the Economic Approach
Without a conceptual framework to understand why people smoke, overeat and 
drink excessively, it is difficult to analyse and assess the effect of policies to 
reduce these behaviours.
Understanding individual behaviour and decision 
making
There are important reasons why policymakers should distinguish carefully 
between private and external costs and why reductions in the latter should be 
the most appropriate goal for policy. One of the main reasons is that policymakers 
are heavily information constrained and are far less able to assess private costs 
and benefits on an individual, case-by-case basis than the individuals who 
actually bear those costs and benefits. In such a heavily information-constrained 
environment, policies which seek to override the principle of consumer 
sovereignty, no matter how well-intentioned they may be, run a significant risk 
of reducing the community’s wellbeing.
Furthermore, it is private costs and benefits that motivate individuals to 
behave in the way they do, and which induce them to make the choices that 
are observed in the data. By failing to distinguish between private and external 
costs in the policymaking process, there is a risk that policymakers will fail 
to understand how both private and external costs are generated and why 
individuals behave the way they do and make the choices that we observe. A 
failure to understand and appreciate the reasons behind individual behaviour 
means that future choices cannot be confidently predicted, which in turn means 
that the likely behavioural response of individuals to policy changes (such as 
taxes, price regulation and quantity regulation) will be difficult to forecast, let 
alone measure in any meaningful way.
For example, if all consumer choices are assumed to be ‘irrational’, then how 
can the likely implications of policy decisions for the community’s wellbeing be 
ascertained? Individuals compare the private benefits of a particular choice with 
private costs. Policy changes usually seek to alter that benefit-cost calculus in 
order to change the consumer’s choice and better align their private incentives 
with social costs and benefits. But the resulting choices that are made after policy 
interventions occur are still the result of a (policy-modified) private benefit-cost 
calculation.  Ignoring the fact that there are private benefits of certain choices and 
that there are costs incurred by individuals when they change their behaviour, 
or pretending that the private benefits of certain consumption choices do not 
exist is not realistic and simply makes policy analysis less rigorous.
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An example: The rational-addiction model
Many forms of consumption are habit-forming, and some are addictive, 
including smoking, jogging, attending church, using heroin and eating corn 
flakes. That does not imply that the behaviour of addicts is unpredictable. 
Indeed, the Taskforce Report presumes that smokers respond in predictable 
ways to increases in prices and information about the health costs of smoking.
The theory of rational addiction (Becker and Murphy 1988) applies the standard 
economic approach — individuals have simple objectives and tend to choose 
the best way to achieve them — to addiction. The rationality assumption is that 
people choose the correct way. It does not imply that people use formal rational 
analysis.
Rational behaviour is the predictable element in human behaviour. To assume 
irrationality is to abandon attempts to explain or predict behaviour and makes it 
difficult to determine the effects of policies to change behaviour. The purpose of 
rational-addiction theory is not to assert that all addicts are rational or to assert 
the ascendency of economics, but to better predict behaviour and the effects of 
various changes. It is useful if it produces sharper and richer predictions that 
are empirically correct and insights into addictive behaviour.
In the rational-addiction model, rational consumers maximise utility from stable 
preferences as they try to anticipate the future consequences of their choices. 
For the addictive good, an increase in current consumption increases future 
consumption of the good, and so current utility depends on past consumption.
For example, the theory of rational addiction predicts that addicts will respond 
to price changes, and addicts may pay more attention to price than light users. 
Indeed, rational addicts should respond to anticipated future price increases 
before they even occur. A number of empirical studies have found that to be the 
case. For example, Becker et al. (1994) found that cigarette consumption falls 
when a price increase is expected, but before it actually rises.
In the theory, habitual behaviour displays a positive relation between past and 
current consumption. A strong habit may become an addiction. A necessary 
condition for a good to be habit-forming, and potentially addictive, is that past 
consumption of the good raises the marginal utility of current consumption. 
Addiction may be beneficial (for example, jogging) or harmful (for example, 
heroin).11
The theory of rational addiction, which is not referred to in the Taskforce 
Report, explains many well-known features of addictions, such as bingeing, 
11 For an excellent summary of rational addiction theory, see Becker (1992), which these paragraphs draw on.
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bifurcated demand (for strongly addictive goods, people either consume a lot 
or abstain) and why strong addictions must terminate abruptly (going ‘cold 
turkey’). These behaviours are consistent with people trying to anticipate the 
future consequences of their choices; there is no need to abandon the economic 
approach or to assume irrationality to explain them.
The theory can also predict the characteristics of people likely to become 
addicted. A good may be addictive to some people, but not others. For example, 
because the consumer is forward looking, the ‘full price’ of a harmful good 
includes the money value of the future adverse effects on utility or earnings. 
The adverse effects depend on the total amount of past consumption. This cost 
will be lower to less future-oriented people (present-oriented or the impatient 
— those with high discount rates, to use economic jargon). The present-oriented 
are more likely to become addicted to harmful goods, because an increase in 
consumption leads to a smaller rise in the full-price when the future is more 
heavily discounted.12
When the health costs of smoking became known from the mid-1960s, the 
full price of smoking increased. Smoking rates went down dramatically, even 
amongst supposedly present-oriented teenagers, indicating that smokers do 
respond to information about future consequences. Those who smoke after 
the new information became available may be more myopic than quitters and 
people who do not begin to smoke. This explains the stronger negative relation 
between education and smoking in the 1970s and 1980s than before the health 
consequences became widely known (more future-oriented people are more 
likely to become educated, which involves delayed benefits).13 Further, ongoing 
economic growth increases earnings and raises the value of future adverse 
effects. We would expect a downward trend in smoking prevalence from this 
increase in the full price, even with a constant money price.
Unfortunately, the rational-addiction model is widely misunderstood. For 
example, the Cancer Council’s comprehensive review of tobacco in Australia 
criticises the model because: ‘The model would predict that individuals rarely 
regret past decisions about consumption, a theory not borne out in interviews 
with current smokers, almost all of whom regret ever having started smoking.’14
However, individuals are uncertain as to whether they will become addicted; 
nothing in the theory presumes that people know for sure whether they will 
become addicted. Things may not turn out well, and an individual may regret 
smoking so much when young, and may try to fight his addiction. On the other 
12 See Becker and Murphy (1988): 682.
13 Ibid: 687.
14 Scollo and Winstanley (2008): chapter 13, 10–11.
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hand, continuing to smoke may be rational in the face of the costs of giving up. 
That some decisions about actions with uncertain consequences turn out badly 
does not mean the initial decision was irrational.
As Becker and Murphy state in the original paper on rational addiction, their 
approach does not imply addicts are happy: ‘Although our model does assume 
that addicts are rational and maximize utility, they would not be happy if their 
addiction results from anxiety-raising events, such as death and divorce, which 
lower their utility. Therefore, our model recognizes that people become addicted 
precisely because they are unhappy.’15
Harmful addictions are often traceable to anxiety, tension and insecurity 
produced by stressful events (divorce, unemployment, death of a loved one). 
Temporary events can cause rational people to become addicted.
Indeed, for a harmful good, the model predicts that greater past consumption 
can lower present utility because of adverse health effects. Further, given 
levels of consumption of the harmful good may be less satisfying when past 
consumption has been greater (the user develops a tolerance). That is, higher 
past consumption lowers the present utility from the same consumption level, 
but raises the marginal utility of consuming the addictive good (reinforcement).16
Policy implications of the rational-addiction model
The rational-addiction approach has a number of implications for policies to 
reduce smoking and other addictive behaviour. As current heavy smokers 
are likely to be present-oriented, campaigns that emphasise the future health 
costs of smoking are likely to have little effect. Raising taxes is likely to be 
more effective for these individuals, as the money price of cigarettes is a larger 
component of the full price for present-oriented people.
The opposite would be true for light users, who would tend to be more future-
oriented than heavy users (but less so than abstainers). On the other hand, the 
health costs of smoking are widely known, and smokers are likely to have taken 
them into account already.
If the health benefits come from quitting altogether, rather than from simply 
cutting back, then it is precisely the addicts (who are more likely to quit 
altogether) at whom the policy should be aimed. Becker, Murphy and Grossman 
(1991) found that lower income and younger people respond more to price 
changes. Others respond more to future harmful effects.
15 Becker and Murphy (1988): 691.
16 See Becker and Murphy (1988): 681–82; Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1991): 237; and Becker (1992): 
120.
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Furthermore, the rational-addiction model highlights that the policies 
recommended in the Taskforce Report to reduce smoking, excessive drinking 
and weight gain may have costs that are not considered in the Report. ‘Kicking’ 
a habit has benefits, but it also involves real psychological, health and economic 
costs. People continue to smoke, drink and eat fatty foods, even when addicted, 
because giving up would make them less happy, just as it is rational for others 
to give up and bear the short-term loss in utility for a larger long-term gain. 
With uncertainty on the best approach to minimise the costs of quitting for a 
particular individual, and substantial short-run loss in utility from stopping, an 
addict may have several failed attempts at quitting.
Failing to consider and understand private motives for consumption choices 
and the costs of changing behaviour also increases the risk that policymakers 
will devise and implement policies that are either ineffective from an overall 
welfare perspective or which create unintended negative consequences.
The economics of unintended consequences: Cross 
price elasticities and external costs and benefits in 
related markets
The economic approach sheds light on the simple approach to corrective taxation: 
for a good whose consumption generates external costs, the tax should be set 
equal to those marginal external effects, where the marginal external effects 
are measured at the efficient consumption point. However, if the tax causes 
consumers to substitute towards other goods whose consumption also generates 
external costs (or external benefits) and which are not taxed appropriately, then 
the simple Pigouvian rule may have to be modified.
A tax increase induces consumers to switch into some other activities 
(substitutes) and away from others (complements). The switch out of the taxed 
activity may reduce health costs, but the switch into other activities (and away 
from complements) may increase health costs. In other words, taxes may have 
unintended consequences.
A good example is alcohol taxation. Some forms of alcohol are substitutes with 
each other; but some are complements. If the cross price elasticity of demand is 
negative (positive), then a price rise on a good in one market induces a fall (rise) 
in consumption in another market, and the goods are complements (substitutes).
Evidence from the UK and elsewhere suggests that beer and wine are 
complements, whereas spirits and wine are substitutes. Raising taxes on one 
form (for example, ready-to-drink mixes or RTDs) induces substitution into 
other kinds of alcohol, or simply into other forms of consuming the same drink 
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(consumers may simply make their own ‘alcopops’). The tax induces a reduction 
in demand of the good whose price rises, but does not address the underlying 
health problem because of the existence of close substitutes with a lower price. 
Unless the price of each good, as perceived by the consumer, fully incorporates 
its health consequences, the result of that substitution may be a deterioration 
in health.
More formally, in the Pigouvian framework, the substitutes and complements of 
taxed activities may themselves have social external costs or benefits. If prices in 
those markets do not reflect social marginal costs and benefits, then changes in 
activity that occur in these other markets will have welfare consequences that 
are not reflected in the market for the good that is being taxed.
There is a large body of evidence on health prevention, substitution effects and 
unintended consequences. For example:
•	 There is evidence (for example, Dinardo and Lemieux 1992) that raising the 
minimum drinking age in some US States reduced alcohol prevalence but 
increased the prevalence of marijuana consumption.
•	 There is evidence that smoking cessation leads to weight gain (Flegal et al. 
1995), particularly among low-income consumers (Filozof 2004).
•	 To the extent to which increased taxes and plain packaging encourage 
substitution into illegally supplied tobacco (chop-chop), costs (including 
forgone revenue) are borne with no offsetting health benefit (if anything, 
health costs may increase). The existence of illicit supplies is a serious 
constraint.
•	 To the extent that higher tobacco taxation is associated with higher 
smuggling, inappropriate policies aimed at reducing smoking prevalence 
may themselves lead to increases in smuggling and other crime rates, with a 
very low reduction in actual smoking prevalence.
•	 Drug prohibition is an example of a policy which has had costly unintended 
consequences. There is a significant body of economic evidence which 
shows that prohibition promotes violent crime. Miron (2001) shows that 
there is a positive relationship between the enforcement of prohibition and 
homicide. Goldstein et al. (1989, 1997) find that a large proportion (almost 
three-quarters) of drug-related murders were due to conflict or disputes over 
drug territory, drug debts and other drug-related trade issues, rather than 
the psychopharmacological effects of drugs.
•	 In a recently published theoretical study, Yaniv et al. (2009) show that a 
‘fat tax’ reduces obesity among individuals who are not weight conscious, 
but for weight-conscious individuals a ‘fat tax’ could increase obesity by 
reducing both the consumption of junk food and the amount of time devoted 
to exercise and physical activity if the substitution away from fast foods 
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towards home-cooked meals brought about by the fat tax means that the 
individual no longer has time to exercise.
Best-practice regulation, cost-benefit analysis, and 
regulatory impact statements
In Australia, the economic approach to policymaking is deemed so useful that 
it is mandated in an attempt to limit excessive and inefficient regulation. New 
regulatory proposals are subject to a Best Practice Regulatory Framework. This 
framework’s requirements can be found in the Best Practice Regulation Handbook. 
The framework ‘requires a structured approach to policy development that 
systematically evaluates costs and benefits’, which includes:
Consideration of a range of options for achieving the objective (as well as 
a ‘no action’ or status quo option) and an analysis of the likely economic, 
social and environmental consequences The policy development 
process should at least ensure that the benefits to the community of any 
regulation actually outweigh the costs, and give some assurance that the 
option chosen will yield the greatest net benefits.17
Significant proposals should be subject to formal cost-benefit analysis and 
the principles of good regulatory process require that: ‘Only the option that 
generates the greatest net benefit for the community, taking into account all the 
impacts, should be adopted.’18
Compliance with the procedures and processes outlined in the Best Practice 
Regulation Handbook remains mandatory for all Australian Government 
departments, agencies, statutory authorities and boards that make, review or 
reform regulations.
The Taskforce Report falls far short of these rigorous standards. For example, 
the compliance costs or the effect on market competition of the proposals are not 
assessed or analysed. Indeed, the Report (p.242) recommends exempting liquor-
control legislation from ‘the constraints of National Competition Policy’, and 
adopts the approach that the more cigarette companies object to a proposal, the 
better it is: ‘Shareholder nervousness and industry opposition to restrictions on 
pack design are a strong indication of the importance of packaging to tobacco 
sales’ (p.181).
But the question that needs to be answered for sound policy analysis and advice 
is how to achieve policy objectives in the least costly way, not to inflict as much 
cost on individual businesses and industries as possible.
17 Australian Government (2007): 1–2.
18 Australian Government (2007): 2.
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Conclusion
In summary, the approach taken by the Taskforce can be encapsulated in the 
following five points:
1. Certain activities create health costs — and, therefore, are judged to be 
automatically undesirable.
2. It automatically follows that there is a role for government to do something 
to discourage individuals from undertaking those activities.
3. The Taskforce then sets arbitrary targets for reductions in these particular 
activities.
4. The Taskforce then develops recommendations for policymakers to achieve 
those targets, without examining the social costs and benefits of those 
policies.
5. Finally, the Taskforce asserts, without evidence, that the policies that have 
been recommended will achieve these arbitrarily chosen targets.
The National Preventative Health Taskforce Report has bypassed the hard work 
that is needed to the make the credible cost-benefit calculations required for 
rigorous public policy analysis. Establishing that smoking, excessive eating and 
excessive drinking lead to poor health outcomes does not establish that the 
Taskforce Report’s policy recommendations aimed at reducing these things will 
be beneficial, effective, or even work in the desired fashion. Policymakers need 
to know the costs involved, how smoking, eating and drinking will be affected 
and the health benefits that would flow from each change.
The Preventative Health Taskforce Report has set some arbitrary targets for 
reductions in the number of people who smoke, drink excessively and are 
overweight and has suggested policies to achieve these targets. However, 
although the Taskforce Report cites many papers and presents hosts of statistics 
and data, there is no systematic assessment of the costs and benefits of the 
recommended polices.
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